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Abstract 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war utilizing Waltz’s three 
levels of analysis, system, state and decision-makers. It first examines the causes, looking at why the 
MENA regional system, but particularly the Arab-Israeli subsystem, was so war prone; assessing why a 
certain bellicoseness was built into both Israel and several of its Arab neighbours; and assesses the 
calculations and miscalculations by leaders on both sides that led to war. 1967 was a “war of 
vulnerability" and miscalculation for Egypt but for Israel the war derived from a mix of vulnerability 
(from vulnerable borders) and opportunity (to acquire “defensible’ borders). The paper then examines 
why the 1967 war did not lead to peace, but rather to a chain of new wars.  Victory in 1967 reinforced 
Israel’s territorial ambitions; shifted the power balance decisively toward it; and ultimately shattered 
Arab unity against it; but because the imbalance in Israel’s favour was insufficient to impose a pro-Israeli 
peace, the result was new wars in which Arab states sought to reverse and Israel to reinforce the verdict 
of 1967. 
 
 
Watershed wars transform the power balance and affect identities and the norms of 
conduct in regional states systems. The 1967 war was a pivotal event shaping the 
Middle East region, although it has to be paired with the subsequent 1973 war since, in 
important ways, these were two rounds of the same war, and it is together that their 
impact has to be understood. Together they did change the power balance and initiate 
changes in identities that reshaped the regional order. Yet despite their potential to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, they perpetuated it.  Although ostensibly initiating a 
desultory peace process, they actually added new grievances and issues leading to a 
chain of wars that further entrenched the conflict as an intractable feature of regional 
politics.  
 What explains this? As Waltz famously argued, explanations have to be explored 
at three levels, system, state and decision-maker;1 but, additionally, whether a war leads 
to further wars depends on the kind of war and its outcome. This paper will present a 
framework of analysis that takes account of these factors. Guided by Waltz’s three level 
paradigm, it will examine the 1967 war and its consequences for the region.  
 
 
A WALTZIAN FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE 1967 
WAR  
 
System Level 1: Creating a War System in MENA:  
The post World War I “peace to end all peace” (in Fromkin’s words)2 imposed a states 
system on MENA that had built-in war proneness, from multiple territorial conflicts and 
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from the pervasive irredentism caused by the incongruence between identities and 
arbitrarily drawn boundaries--what Miller3 called the nation-state imbalance. Two 
British demarches, the “Sykes Picot agreement,” which arbitrarily divided up the Levant 
between Britain and France, and the Balfour Declaration, which turned over a part of it 
to Zionist settlers, drove and epitomized the flaws of the regional order. In observing 
that the Middle East states system was ‘born fighting,’ Buzan and Waever4 pointed to 
how the simultaneity of formal Arab independence after WWII and the outbreak of the 
first Arab-Israeli war established the major line of identity cleavage and threat around 
which the regional system was rapidly organized.  
 The Zionist project meant two peoples claiming the same land and conflict 
between incoming settlers and the Palestinian community was inevitable.5  The first 
Arab-Israeli war transformed this sub-state communal conflict into an intractable inter 
state conflict and created the conditions for further wars since the fighting was ended 
by a mere armistice that left the main issues unresolved.6  
 In Arab eyes, Israel was no ordinary state but an extension of the West, which, 
seizing much more of Palestine than the UN partition plan had assigned to it and 
seeking to incorporate Jews from around the world at the expense of the Palestinian 
Arabs, had a limitless appetite for expansion. The Arab states refused to establish 
normal relations with Israel and imposed an economic boycott against it; championship 
of the Palestinian cause became an indispensable nationalist credential for aspiring 
Arab political leaders.  
 For Israel, the war left it without readily defensible borders, while a portion of 
biblical Israel (the West Bank) remained in Arab hands. Security was foremost on the 
agenda of the new state because, although the military capabilities of the Arab states 
were modest, Israel's small geographic space, lack of strategic depth and encirclement 
by a hostile Arab world with ten times its population, led to a sense of permanent siege. 
Israel sought forcibly to extract recognition on its terms: Arab acceptance of its control 
of most of Palestine without Israeli concessions over borders or the Palestinian 
refugees. Continual disputes between Israel and the Arab states over poorly demarcated 
borders, de-militarised zones and water rights also regularly escalated into military 
clashes, inflaming and spreading Pan Arab nationalism which preached the idea of a 
common Arab nation united against Israel and its Western backers. The 1956 Suez war, 
a second attempt by Israel to impose its terms, ended in stalemate, but Egypt’s Nasser 
was lionized in the Arab world for his resistance to the combined assault of Israel and 
the Western imperialist states, Britain and France. The 1956 war was a watershed in 
that it ushered in an Egypt-centric Arab order for which Egypt’s Nasser, a hero of Pan-
Arab stature, could lay down the rules, largely by virtue of his ability to mobilize the 
“street” of most Arab countries to demand their governments follow his lead. The norms 
of this new order were Arab unity, anti-imperialism, and defence of the Palestine cause. 
The trans-state appeal of Nasserite Arab nationalism led to the overthrow of old 
regimes across the Arab world, replaced by radical nationalist military regimes, of 
which the post-1963 Ba’thist regime in Syria was the epitome, that were more 
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motivated and better equipped to confront Israel and, each vying for Pan-Arab 
leadership, sought trusteeship of the Palestine cause as a major prize.7  
 
State Level: in-build war proneness? 
How states are constituted and regimes are designed can, in Waltz’s “second image,” 
determine their war-proneness. MENA suffers from an exceptional number of war-
prone states, reflective of the widespread irredentism embedded in MENA society, 
Indicative of that is the fact that those states that legitimize themselves on the basis of 
popular sovereignty are more belligerent than the Arab monarchies, whose legitimacy 
depends on tradition. Thus, in the Arab world, the populist authoritarian republics, the 
products of the deep irredentist sentiment fermenting in Arab societies, were quite war 
prone: although there are only nine of them they were involved 17 times in the region’s 
19 wars from 1946-2010. They typically came to power through revolutionary coups by 
nationalist military officers or alliances of the military and a radical nationalist party. As 
revolutionary regimes, they had a certain ideological impulse to export their revolutions 
regardless of the risk of provoking war. Enjoying neither democratic or tradition 
legitimacy, they legitimized their rule in terms of social reform and Arab nationalism 
and the latter required they be seen to deliver on the Arab nationalist agenda: anti-
imperialism, Arab unity, championing the Palestine cause. There were few 
constitutional checks on authoritarian presidents if they wished to pursue this agenda; 
indeed, the military was typically the strongest interest group, which, preoccupied with 
external threats, pushed for arms races, notably with Israel. These characteristics were 
bound to lead the revolutionary republics into wars, intended or accidental.8   
 But also Israel, a democracy legitimized by popular sovereignty, was similarly 
driven by irredentism. It has been at the centre of 8 regional wars counting the assaults 
on Gaza, three of which were arguably wars of choice (1956, 1967, 1982). Israel 
initiated 25 of 45 militarized disputes in MENA, the world’s highest frequency of such 
initiations relative to its period in existence.9 Arguably, this is down to Israel’s special 
character as an irredentist settler state, which makes it both insecure and expansionist. 
Though more militarily powerful than the Arab states, its insecurity comes from its 
rejection by the Arab world combine with its initial lack of strategic depth: given the 
vulnerability of its borders, Israel could not afford to fight a war on its territory and had 
to take one into the enemy's territory before it could threaten the homeland; 
additionally, being reliant on the mobilisation of reserves, it could not sustain a 
prolonged war without great damage to its economy, hence wars had to be won quickly 
through overwhelming force. This resulted in a doctrine favouring a ‘pre-emptive’ (first 
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strike) strategy that, given the constant tension with its neighbours, was bound to get 
Israel into multiple wars. 
 But, additionally, Israel, as a settler state, has a certain expansionist impulse built 
into it. According to the Law of Return, Diaspora Jews have a right of citizenship and 
Israeli policy actively promoted Jewish emigration, often settled on land from which 
Palestinians were dispossessed.10 Absorbing a growing population in an arid land led 
Israel to seek greater control over regional water resources, initiating projects to divert 
the waters of the Jordan River in the 1960s that the Arabs took as a provocation and a 
bid to further emigration. The pressure for more land was reinforced by dissatisfaction 
among many Israelis with the incomplete Judaization of the territory of ancient Eretz 
Yisrael and the consequent belief among militant nationalists that the completion of the 
Zionist project required the incorporation of ‘Judea/Samaria’--before 1967 the 
Jordanian-controlled ‘West Bank’ of the Jordan River. Thus irredentism, insecurity and 
expansionism built war proneness into the fabric of the Israel state.  
 
The Impact of the 1967 War: Kind and Consequences 
While states’ built-in war proneness predispose the region to chains of wars, whether a 
war leads to more war or not depends in good part on the kind of the original war and 
its outcome. 
 1967: what kind of war? Janice Stein11 distinguishes wars of vulnerability, in 
which leaders perceive they have “no choice” from “wars of choice” or of opportunity; 
realists distinguish defensive realist states that only seek a sufficiency of power to deter 
enemies and get into wars unwillingly from offensive realists seeking hegemony that 
wage wars of choice. This overlaps with Schweller’s12 distinction between status quo 
states that value what they have more than what they might get in a war vs. revisionist 
states that value what they might get in war over what they have.  
 At first sight, the 1967 war appears, as Stein argues and others concur, to be a 
war of vulnerability on both sides, with neither seeking a war but events spiralling out 
of control. Most accept that Nasser stumbled into war from miscalculation and that he 
was entrapped by Pan-Arab outbidding into a showdown in which he hoped to make 
political gains but to avoid war, counting on superpower intervention which did not 
materialize. 13 
  For Israel the 1967 war was, on the face of it, a the classic defensive war fought 
for security: on the eve of the war, Israel was surrounded, Egypt had provided several 
causus belli and the war is usually described as a pre-emptive one; Israel struck first 
because war seemed inevitable. And yet the evidence is clear that Israel was not 
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seriously threatened militarily. Popp, 14  on the basis of recently de-classified 
information, shows that 1967 was a war of choice, and that Israel had a premeditation 
to commence hostilities since the balance of forces made a military defeat virtually 
impossible. The Israeli generals were "spoiling for a fight" 15 Even less was it a pre-
emptive war--heading off an Egyptian attack--since Egypt had no intention of 
attacking.16 As Prime Minister Begin later admitted: “In June 1967, we again had a 
choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that 
Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to 
attack him.”17 A good part of the Israeli rationale, however, was to acquire defensive 
borders. 1967 was a “war of vulnerability" and miscalculation for Egypt but for Israel 
the war derived from a mix of vulnerability (from vulnerable borders) and opportunity 
(to acquire “defensible’ borders).  
 The consequences of war outcomes for state orientations: The outcome of wars 
helps determine whether there will be a peace settlement or another war. Neo-realism 
expects lost wars to socialize states into the rules of the game, inducing greater 
prudence: tailoring ambitions and subordinating ideology to the calculations of the 
balance of power; conversely, victory in war could, in principle, stimulate ambition and 
over-confidence in the utility of war, and states would be more likely to overreach 
themselves, increasing the likelihood of war. However, realism also expects that the 
imbalances resulting from a defeat would stimulate efforts to right the power imbalance 
by the losing side, potentially restoring deterrence on both sides.  
 If we combine the kind of war with its outcome, we get several permutations. A 
victorious war of choice by a revisionist power is likely to reinforce revisionism and 
chances of further war; but victory in a war of vulnerability by an insecure power may 
reduce insecurity, enabling peace. Defeat of an revisionist power in a war of choice is 
likely to reduce revisionism but defeat of a insecure power will increase its sense of 
vulnerability, which could either make it either more risk averse or drive it to build up 
its capacity and reverse the verdict of defeat. Stalemate in war leaves an indeterminate 
impact on states’ orientations.   
 It takes two to make a war and whether there is another one depends on the 
impact of war on both states: so what might we have expected from the outcomes for 
both sides in 1967 and 1973? Other things being equal, the differential experience of 
1967--a humiliating loss for the Arabs, an exhilarating victory for the Israelis, ought to 
have had diverging impacts. Victory was likely to reinforce Israeli ambitions and its 
belief in the utility of war while defeat was likely to have tempered Arab revisionism--
but not necessarily enough to make them accept Israeli terms. The 1973 war, in which 
there was no clear victor or defeated ought, on the other hand, to have produced a 
certain convergence toward prudence on both sides and might have led to peace—yet it 
did not. To explain why, other factors, such as the systemic level power balance and the 
calculations of individual leaders and their governing coalitions have to be taken into 
account. 
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System Level II: The Occasions of War and the Balance of Power 
The power balance shapes whether states perceive war as a viable option. When a 
stable balance exists, if the power of both sides is equal, neither should be sure enough 
of winning a war to initiate one (unless they feel they have no choice), while a major 
stable imbalance should deter war by the weaker side. The region is, however, 
susceptible to sudden shifts in the balance of power because of its high level of 
militarization and arms races funded by states’ exceptional access to revenues from oil 
(Arab states) or foreign aid (Israel) and the willingness of great power patrons and 
arms merchants to provide arms.  Such an unstable power balance encourages 
miscalculations (exaggerating threat or exaggerating ones own capabilities) that may 
lead to war. Moreover, as the power transition school argues,18 the most dangerous 
situation is when a rising second rank dissatisfied power approaches the power 
capabilities of a superior power; the latter may try to pre-empt this via war or the 
former (mis)-calculate that it’s best chance has arrived. Lemke finds that the 
combination of dissatisfaction and near-power parity increased the chance of war in 
MENA by 76%.19  
 Wars, once fought, may not just alter the power balance in favour of the victor, 
but also wars over hegemony in a region may transform it; at the same time, however, 
neo-realism expects states to combine against and prevent a rising hegemon, unless its 
bid has some legitimacy and is seen as likely to deliver public goods for a region; in 
MENA, however, aspirant hegemons have always been checked by counter-balancing.20 
 How does this relate to Arab-Israeli wars? 1967 approximated the power 
transition scenario in that the Arab states seemed to be approaching parity with Israel, 
hence a “preventive” war by the latter aimed to forestall this. After 1967 the power 
balance was dramatically altered in favour of Israel; however, this stimulated efforts on 
the part of Israel’s neighbours to right the power balance (rebuilding of the shattered 
Egyptian and Syrian armies) which, to a degree succeeded so that again on the eve of 
the 1973 war the power transition scenario could be said to have been restored. 1973 
seemed to establish a balance that might have been favourable to a peace settlement, 
but Egypt’s separate peace again upset it in Israel’s favour, enabling Israel’s 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. But once again its Arab rivals found ways of restoring some 
balance (Syria’s reach for “strategic parity; Hizbollah’s “asymmetric warfare”). Israel’s 
1982 bid for military hegemony failed and was replaced by a certain mutual deterrence; 
yet in other respects the power transition scenario still held as arms races amidst 
unresolved grievances continued. This history shows us that power balancing will often 
fail to prevent war, but it does prevent victors from establishing hegemony since losing 
states mobilize the capabilities and allies to blunt aggression or when, after a first war 
they fall sharply behind, they redress the power imbalance. The lesson of the Arab-
Israeli conflict seems to be that, so long as deep grievances remain unsatisfied, systemic 
conditions—the power transition scenario--continues to lead decision-makers to think 
that they can use war to impose their terms; yet because in reality no side is strong 
enough to do this, war after war continues to be waged. 
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 This is provided, of course, that both sides have the resources to continue the 
contest. As noted above, regional states are readily able to acquire arms (and 
asymmetric warfare does not require much sophisticated hardware). Here the role of 
the global level great powers, which have typically been patrons of regional states, 
matters.  In MENA the record is that global patrons both contain war by exercising 
restraint over clients yet also provide the latter with the means of war— creating arms 
races. Post-war, a defeated client may be buffered from the consequences of war; thus, 
the Soviet Union’s rearmament of Egyptian and Syrian armies (backed by Gulf Arab 
funders) enabled these states to avoid submission to Israeli peace terms; on the other 
hand, the US, impressed by Israeli war prowess in 1967, thereafter viewed it as a 
“strategic asset” (not a liability that had to be protected) and adopted a policy of arms 
deliveries to keep Israel stronger than all of the Arab states combined. The consequence 
was the reproduction of the power transition scenario. If, additionally, patrons cease to 
restrain their clients, war becomes likely, as happened in 1967 (failure of US restraint of 
Israel), 1973 (failure of Soviet restraint of the Arabs) and 1982 (failure of US restraint of 
Israel). 
  
Individual Level: hawks vs. doves 
The strategies, calculations and personalities of leaders (e.g. aggressive personalities) 
and ruling coalition interests (e.g. domestic legitimacy needs) can make a difference if 
other conditions are evenly balanced for and against war. Leaders famously 
miscalculate, either exaggerating threat or their own capabilities, as Nasser famously 
did in 1967. Changes in leadership are likely in war-losing states where more 
pragmatic, cautious leaders emerge (Sadat and Asad); where states were victorious, 
they might feel more secure, but hardliners are empowered and ambitions expand 
(Begin, Sharon). The balance between rival coalitions can shift calculations, too. In the 
Arab case, the Arab nationalist ideologues of the sixties were eclipsed after 1967 by 
pragmatists prioritizing state interests. The 1967 war, in giving Israeli control of the 
occupied territories, radically empowered irredentists intent on settling these 
territories—the single most important factor in obstructing peace and generating a 
chain of wars. Where wars end in stalemates, such as 1973 and 1982, the domestic 
power struggle between dovish and hawkish coalitions may be decisive for whether 
there is soon another war; in Israel the fact that the Likud was able to take advantage of 
a perception that the Labour Party had not won the 1973 war paved the way for 
electoral shifts that led to the 1982 war.  
 
 
APPLYING THE WALTZIAN FRAMEWORK TO THE 1967 WAR AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 
 
The drivers of the 1967 War 
In the following section, the historical evolution of the events leading to the 1967 war 
and its aftermath will be traced, informed by the previous Waltzian framework. 
 
Arab regional dynamics:   
Israel's attack on its neighbours unleashed the war but it was the dynamics of Pan-
Arabism which gave Israeli hawks the opportunity to realise their ambitions; 
specifically, Nasser's need to protect his Arab leadership against challenges from both 
the left and the right led him into fatal brinkmanship in the spring of 196721  
From the mid-1960s, Egypt, as Pan-Arab leader, was under growing pressure to 
act against Israel's diversion of the Jordan River. Also, the Palestinian refugees were 
increasingly impatient for Arab action to resolve their plight; indeed, newly founded 
groups such as al-Fatah launched a guerrilla struggle against Israel that they hoped 
would detonate a wider Arab-Israeli war. Nasser argued that the Arab world had to 
build up its forces, modernise and unify before it would be ready for confrontation with 
Israel and, with his best forces tied down in the Yemen civil war, he could hardly afford 
a war. But his Arab rivals, particularly Syria, used the issue to put him on the defensive22  
The Syrian-Israeli conflict dated back to differences over the de-militarised zones 
established by the 1948 armistice. Israel’s ‘creeping annexation’ of these zones23, Syrian 
shelling of the paramilitary settlements Israel implanted in them, and the resulting 
massive Israeli retaliation, generated a particularly radical version of Arab nationalism 
in Syria and was a factor in bringing the Ba'th party to power in 1963. The radical but 
narrow based Ba'thist regime began championing the Palestine cause to win domestic 
legitimacy and outbid Nasser for Pan-Arab leadership. To contain revisionist Syria, 
Nasser initiated Arab summit meetings to spread responsibility for inaction among the 
Arab leaders. The summits agreed to counter Israel by diverting the Jordan River 
sources, which, since these rose in Syria, would force Damascus to bear the 
consequences of its own militancy. However, the Syrian Ba'th use Israeli attacks on its 
diversion works to embarrass Nasser, criticising the UN buffer force in the Sinai (UNEF) 
which prevented him from deterring Israel. Saudi Arabia, at odds with Egypt over 
Yemen, taunted Nasser for having troops in Yemen when they were needed against 
Israel. Syria took advantage of this to entice Nasser into a radical Cairo-Damascus axis. 
While Nasser hoped this would remove Syria’s incentive for nationalist outbidding, 
Damascus viewed it as the essential backing for its sponsorship of Palestinian guerrilla 
warfare against Israel. This fedayeen action was the immediate precipitant of the 
escalation that would lead to war.24  It also prepared the ground for bringing Jordan into 
the Arab coalition encircling Israel. An Israel raid on Jordan because of guerrilla attacks 
sponsored by Syria had convinced King Hussein that Israel did not reward moderation. 
He responded to the Cairo propaganda attacks that were stirring up his population by 
goading Nasser for his inaction, helping to bring about the inflamed crisis of May 1967 
in which aroused public opinion forced him to stand against Israel. Even knowing it 
could cost him his territory and army, domestic pressure left Hussein no choice but to 
align with Egypt and Syria as war approached25.   
 That crisis was provoked when in May 1967 Israeli retaliations for guerrilla 
incursions by Syrian-backed Palestinians climaxed in an Israeli threat to attack and 
overthrow the Syrian regime. The Soviet Union prodded Nasser to deter Israel and, as 
leader of the Arab world, he felt obliged to do so. Nasser realised the power balance, 
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with his best forces tied down in Yemen, was unfavourable and did not, therefore, want 
a war but he could not remain passive.  He therefore requested UN withdrawal from the 
Sinai and sent troops into the peninsula as a deterrent and with defensive instructions 
that assumed an Israeli first strike. Israel abandoned plans for an attack on Syria but 
began a counter-mobilization, which put it in a position to launch a more general war.26 
Nasser could have de-escalated but he allowed himself to be pushed into further 
brinkmanship by the expectations raised by his own nationalist rhetoric. Seeing a 
chance to win a political victory and perhaps extract some concessions from Israel on 
the Palestinian issue, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Popular euphoria 
that the Arabs were finally confronting Israel swept the front line states into a defence 
pact encircling Israel.  
Nasser overplayed his hand in the crisis of spring 1967 in part because he had 
become complacent about his ability to manipulate bi-polarity. Nasser’s defence 
minister, General Shams ad-Din Badran apparently misled him into believing the Soviets 
had promised intervention to deter Israel; but, in fact, it was Moscow that would be 
deterred when war broke out by fear of a confrontation with the US. With the Suez 
precedent in mind, Nasser miscalculated that the US would restrain Israel for fear a war 
would inflame Arab opinion against the West or bring confrontation with the USSR. 
Moreover, Nasser had given the US a commitment that Egypt would not be the one to 
initiate war and was led to think that the US was trying to broker a negotiated 
settlement of the crisis that would give him a Suez like political victory. However, in 
Washington, Lyndon Johnson, a friend of Israel, failed to restrain Israel’s march to war.  
In essence, the Arab-nationalist ‘outbidding’ in which the rival Arab states had engaged 
was leading them into a war none wanted. 27 
 
Israeli realpolitik calculations 
As Israel started the war by striking first, understanding the war means understanding 
its motives. Because Israel's superiority was problematic if the Arab forces effectively 
combined and forced a multi-front war on it, preventing such a combination was a 
constant of Israeli policy and this required a pro-active military stance: Israeli war 
doctrine aimed at quickly smashing the enemy and, in a multi-front war, neutralising 
one opponent quickly in order to cope with the other/s. Since collective Arab action had 
normally been a function of Egyptian success in uniting the Arabs and, particularly co-
ordinating with Syria and Jordan, Israel considered a whole range of Egyptian-initiated 
actions to be a casus belli justifying a first strike, notably the concentration of Egyptian 
forces in the Sinai and the ascendancy of Egyptian influence over Jordan: the Israeli 
1967 first strike, responded to such an emerging scenario. Once Israel began to 
mobilise, at economic cost, it would not long wait for diplomacy to end the closure of 
the Straits. Moreover, since weapons, particularly aircraft, were vulnerable while no 
country enjoyed much strategic depth, a first strike could give decisive advantage. Yet, 
the actual military threat to Israel was moderate: Nasser had no intention of striking 
first, the Israeli generals were confident of victory and the CIA backed their assessment. 
Insofar as there was a threat, it was more political than military: a superpower-
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brokered resolution of the crisis that could strengthen Nasser and further embolden the 
Arabs.28 
Israeli elites were initially split over war. An activist camp, dominant in the 
military and led by disciples of Ben Gurion, such as Moshe Dayan, were convinced that 
Israel enjoyed the decisive military superiority to take on the enemy): the crisis was less 
a threat that an opportunity--to smash Nasserist Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement 
while Israel still had military superiority, to achieve secure borders by seizing “buffer 
zones,” and to force the Arabs to accept Israel. In power transition terms, Israel would 
check rising Arab power before the Arabs demographic advantage could be translated 
into military power. At the same time, the irredentist Herut party of Menachem Begin 
saw the crisis as an opportunity to realise Eretz Yisrael and it had its advocates in the 
military.29 The moderate Prime Minister Levi Eshkol wished to rely on American 
diplomacy to defuse the crisis and was adverse to a pre-emptive strike but he 
succumbed to military pressure and the hawks took charge of actual military decision-
making. Pre-emption was Israel's historic strategy and the main restraint on it had 
always been fear of the international repercussions, but in June 1967 the international 
situation was unusually permissive with the US abdicating its former role in restraining 
Israel. Although far from evident to the Arabs, the imbalance of power in Israeli's favour 
remained substantial and Israel’s first strike was entirely rational.30  
The consequences of the 1967 War:  
Transformed power balance?  
The war ushered in major alterations in the Arab-Israeli balance of power and re-drew 
the regional map to Israel's advantage. Israel not only decisively defeated the Arab 
armies but also seized the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights 
from Syria and the Palestinian populated ‘West Bank’ from Jordan. In upsetting the 
status quo, the war might have led to an Arab-Israeli peace. UNSC resolution 242, jointly 
sponsored by the superpowers in the aftermath of the war, provided an internationally 
accepted framework for a settlement. It amounted in essence to a proposed trade of 
‘land for peace’; in linking the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by conquest to a 
call for all states in the region to be recognised as having the right to live in peace, it 
affirmed that the Arab states would now have to finally accept the existence of Israel 
and Israel would have to withdraw from the territories it had seized. Although Israel 
denied the resolution required it to withdraw from all the territories, all other states, 
including the U.S., interpreted the resolution to mean virtually complete withdrawal.31  
The 1967 war also unleashed a major transformation in Arab attitudes to Israel. 
To be sure, in the short term, the conquest of the 1967 territories further locked the 
Arab states into the conflict with it. The defeated Arab nationalist regimes could not yet 
overtly accept a directly negotiated peace settlement and wanted a UN-sponsored end 
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to belligerency and Israeli withdrawal. But they were under no illusion that they could 
avoid a formal peace treaty if they were to recover their lost lands. Despite some short-
term inflammation of radical public sentiment, the 1967 defeat, in giving a mortal blow 
to Pan-Arab dreams, started the process of Arab acceptance of the permanence, if not 
the legitimacy, of Israel. Egypt's defeat precipitated a realist pragmatism in the 
hegemonic Arab state as Nasser himself began looking to mend relations with the US 
and to find a diplomatic solution to the Israeli occupation.32 Asad's rise in Syria marked 
a similar moderation of nationalism there. Radical Arab states that had challenged Israel 
on behalf of the Palestine cause, in disregard of the power imbalance against them, were 
‘socialised’ the hard way into the rules of realist prudence needed to survive in a 
dangerous states system. King Hussein’s 1970 crushing of the Palestinian fedayeen’s 
attempt to turn Jordan into a base of operations against Israel was another watershed 
that started the gradual moderation of the PLO leadership: it would soon reduce its goal 
to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. To be sure, as the 
chance of a diplomatic settlement faded in the years after 1967, the survival of the front 
line regimes would require they re-vindicate themselves against Israel: they could not 
rest until the occupation of their territory, touching on vital state and regime interests 
more directly than the Palestine cause had ever done, was rolled back. However, as the 
notion of the liberation of Palestine gave way to the aim of recovering the occupied 
territories, an irreconcilable ‘existential’ conflict between the two sides was gradually 
transformed into a limited one over territory that was much more amenable to a 
compromise settlement.33  
Unfortunately, if 1967 marked the beginning of the end of Arab nationalist 
revisionism, it had the opposite effect on a triumphant Israel. Although the military 
hegemony Israel achieved in the war gave it cause to feel more secure, the success of a 
military solution to its insecurity not only reduced its motivation to reach a permanent 
settlement with the Arab states but actually whet its irredentist appetites. Israel 
insisted that a peace settlement would require the Arab states to accept direct 
negotiations and that it was unprepared to return to the 1967 lines. It wanted to keep 
strategic parts of its conquests that it insisted were needed to give it  ‘secure borders’ 
including the Golan Heights, control of the Jordan River Valley, and parts of the Sinai). 
Additionally, the simultaneous rise of an irredentist right-wing settler movement and of 
the Likud party, which, beginning in 1977, started to win elections, propelled attempts 
to colonise and incorporate the territories even though this meant permanent 
repressive rule over a large Palestinian population in violation of international law.34 
The settlement drive decisively obstructed the potential to trade the occupied lands for 
peace. In essence, the 1967 war did not result in the compromise settlement outlined in 
UN Resolution 242 because the power asymmetry gave the Israelis no incentives to 
concede it and the Arab states no capacity to extract it.  As a result, 1967 set the stage 
for three more wars in the space of about a decade, the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition 
(1969-70), the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.35  
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The Arab states system from Arab triangle to the 1973 War 
Another effect of the 1967 war was to transform the Arab system from the Egypt-
centred Pan-Arab one to what Ajami called the ‘Arab Triangle.’36 Nasser's death and 
replacement by Sadat overnight reduced Egypt from hegemon of the Pan-Arab order to 
the status of a ‘normal’ state. Egypt had never had the resources of a well-rounded 
hegemon, either the ability to project military power in the Arab world or the economic 
superiority to provide much in economic rewards and by the late sixties, the costs of 
hegemony--first from Yemen, then from the 1967 defeat--were impoverishing the 
country while the growing oil revenues accruing to the oil monarchies was shifting the 
balance of economic power to them. Cairo's hegemony had been based largely on the 
ideological appeal of Arabism, but this was shattered by the 1967 defeat while growing 
state formation made other states less permeable to Pan-Arab ideological penetration 
from Cairo. President Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, having neither the will nor Pan-
Arab stature to continue Nasser's Pan-Arab role, subordinated all other concerns to the 
recovery of the occupied Sinai. The Egypt-centric Pan-Arab order which could be said to 
have been founded by the outcome of the 1956 Suez war lost the hegemon that had 
enforced and held it together as a result of the 1967 war. 
With the decline of the Egyptian hegemon, other Arab states acquired greater 
freedom to pursue state interests but those interests were now shaped by the much-
increased threat from Israel. Before 1967, the expectation that the great powers would 
restrain Israel, the greater immediate fear of subversion by Arab rivals, and the little 
practical possibility of liberating Palestine had deterred effective alliance building 
against Israel; afterwards, a militarily preponderant and expansive Israel had to be 
contained while the occupied territories were potentially recoverable. This was only 
possible through inter-Arab co-operation and the much-reduced ideological threat of 
Cairo made this co-operation less risky for the other Arab states. Thus, Israel's military 
preponderance sparked an effort on the Arab side to balance it through alliance 
formation and military build-up.37  
Egypt was still the pivotal Arab state and the natural leader of an Arab coalition 
against Israel, but it had now to lead by consensus. Gradually Egypt and Syria, under 
new pragmatic leaders, were thrown together by their common interest in a war for 
recovery of the occupied territories while Saudi Arabia took advantage of their need for 
financial backing to moderate their policies and achieve full partnership in core Arab 
affairs. If no one state had enough assets to play the Arab hegemon, an axis of the largest 
(Egypt), the richest (Saudi Arabia), and most Pan Arab (Syria) states could pool 
complementary resources and forge an Arab consensus on war and peace. This ‘Arab 
Triangle’ would, for a period, replace Egyptian hegemony as a new basis of Arab 
cohesion, allowed by the greater equality, hence trust, between the main leaders, Sadat, 
Asad and Feisal.38  
The three leaders began exploring two tracks for the recovery of the occupied 
territories. Egypt and Syria continued re-building their armies with Soviet arms 
financed by Arab oil money, while Sadat and the Saudis tried to enlist American 
pressure on Israel for a diplomatic settlement. Nasser's acceptance of the Rogers Plan 
had laid the grounds for a settlement and Sadat made new efforts to enlist US help in 
reaching one. However, another Arab-Israeli war became inevitable when the US 
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rebuffed Sadat's diplomatic initiatives: in October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a co-
ordinated attack on the Israeli-occupied territories while Saudi Arabia deployed the oil 
weapon to force the intervention of American diplomacy.39  
 
The 4th Arab-Israeli War of 1973:   
The conduct and outcome of the 1973 war were both shaped by and reshaped the Arab-
Israeli power balance. On the one hand, tactically, Egypt's fears about Israeli air 
superiority led it to adopt a flawed war plan aiming at the mere seizure of a strip of land 
on the East bank of the Suez Canal (in order to break the diplomatic stalemate); this 
allowed Israel to concentrate first on its northern and then its southern fronts, forfeiting 
the advantage of the two-front joint Egyptian-Syrian assault.  When a cease-fire was 
called, the Egyptian army was still clinging to its foothold in the Sinai, but Israeli forces 
were entrenched on the West bank of the canal and the Egyptian Third Army 
surrounded and in bad need of American intervention to restrain Israeli violations of 
the cease-fire and bring about a disengagement of forces. While tactically, Israeli 
emerged from the war with the upper-hand, the war altered the strategic power 
imbalance that had deprived the Arabs of all leverage to negotiate an acceptable 
settlement with Israel. The Arab armies failed to liberate the occupied territories, but 
their ability to challenge Israel and inflict high costs on it and the oil embargo, in 
threatening vital Western interests, sufficiently upset the status quo to force American 
intervention on behalf of a negotiated settlement. At the same time, the relative Arab 
success in the war (compared to 1967) endowed the frontline states with a legitimacy 
windfall that made it less politically risky for them to move toward a peace settlement. 
Arab summits following the war, led by the ‘Arab Triangle’ powers, legitimised a 
‘comprehensive peace’ with Israel in return for its full withdrawal from the occupied 
territories and the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They also 
designated the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians in peace negotiations. 
Arguably, the war gave the Arab states increased leverage to extract the settlement they 
wanted if they stuck together and played their cards right. Israel, for its part, had an 
interest in a partial settlement, that is, one with Egypt, if that left it free to avoid political 
settlements on its other fronts.40  
 A new Arab order—stillborn:  The 1973 war seemed to revive the defunct Pan-
Arab system, albeit in new form. The war caused a massive resurgence of Arab 
nationalism that drove all Arab states to close ranks behind Egypt and Syria: Iraqi and 
Jordanian forces played crucial roles in containing Israeli counteroffensives against 
Syria while Morocco and Saudi Arabia sent token contingents to the front lines and 
Algeria and the Gulf states provided finance for Soviet arms deliveries.41 Not just the 
shared threat but also a shared resource, the new oil wealth from the price boom 
unleashed by the oil embargo, generated interdependence between the Arab states. The 
expectation that the new wealth would be shared with the states that had fought and 
sacrificed for the common Arab cause was partly realised by significant transfers of 
wealth to the latter, the migration of excess labour to the labour scarce Arab oil 
producing monarchies and the transfer of remittances home. The ‘Arab Cold War’ was 
decisively buried as the conservative oil monarchies used aid to moderate the 
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radicalism of the nationalist republics and ideological subversion and media wars gave 
way, in inter-Arab affairs, to inter-state diplomacy.42  
 Consolidation of the individual states meant their increased ability to put state 
sovereignty over Arabism. If the 1973 war and associated oil boom fuelled inter-Arab 
interdependencies, at the same time relative wartime success restored some of the 
legitimacy of the individual states and the new oil money fostered state building. The 
distribution of oil revenues across the system allowed states to build large armies and 
bureaucracies, generate new bourgeoisies with a stake in regimes, and co-opt the 
middle class, which, once the constituency of Arabism, now became or aspired to be 
part of the new state establishments. The very durability of the states as the customary 
framework of political life fostered their growing acceptance, if not strong affective 
support for them. States became far less vulnerable to Pan-Arab penetration as the Pan-
Arab movements, once so readily manipulated by Nasser against his rivals, virtually 
disappeared or were ‘statised:’ thus Ba'thism became the official ideology and the Ba'th 
party an instrument of state co-optation in Syria and Iraq.43  
 
The Shattering of the Arab Triangle: Egypt's Separate Peace: 
Just as the conflict with Israel gave birth to the Arab triangle, so disagreements over the 
conflict's resolution destroyed it as, after the 1973 war, Egypt’s Sadat proceeded step-
by-step, down the road to a separate peace at the expense of his Arab partners. Knowing 
Israel was prepared to trade the bulk of the Sinai for a peace that would remove Egypt, 
the strongest Arab state, from the Arab-Israeli power balance, and that if he stuck with 
Syria and the PLO in insisting on a comprehensive settlement and a Palestinian state, 
that he might get nothing, Sadat entered into negotiations at Camp David for what 
would be a separate peace. For Israel's Begin, the Sinai was a price worth paying since, 
as it became apparent that Sadat would abandon the Palestinians, he saw the chance to 
keep the West Bank. While ostensibly the Camp David agreement provided for 
Palestinian ‘autonomy,’ the subsequent failure of this to be realised did not deter Sadat 
from signing a separate peace with Israel in 1979. At the second Baghdad summit, Iraq 
and Syria jointly forced Saudi Arabia and other wavering states to ostracise Egypt. This, 
in forcing Egypt into greater dependence on the U.S., allowed the virtual neutralisation 
of the core Arab state by a superpower deeply biased toward Israel.44  
 The relative Arab-Israeli power balance resulting from the 1973 war meant 
neither side could hope to impose its will, hence each had an incentive to seek a 
diplomatic solution. This chance was, however, missed, in part because US arms 
deliveries to Israel and Egypt’s separate peace, restored Israel military superiority. This 
not only reduced its incentive to reach a comprehensive peace but radically upset the 
regional power balance as well. Egypt’s opting out of the Arab-Israel power balance 
amounted to a form of ‘buck-passing,’ a practice that enervates the alliance stability 
needed to deter powerful states. In this case, the resulting power imbalance would lead 
directly to the fifth Arab-Israeli war of 1982.  
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 Sadat's move toward a separate peace had, from at least the middle-1970s, 
profoundly damaging consequences for the Arab states system. First, it generated 
deepened insecurity throughout the Arab world that intensified the retreat to state-
centric self-help by the Arab states, notably Syria, while disillusioning the PLO that 
Palestinian interests could be peacefully attained. The first and most destructive 
symptom of these tendencies was the Lebanese civil war, unleashed by conflicts over 
the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Sinai II agreement sparked a showdown between a 
coalition of Palestinians and radical Lebanese Muslims who wanted to challenge Israel 
in southern Lebanon and Maronite Christians determined to eradicate this disruptive 
threat to Lebanese sovereignty. At the same time, Syria, left extremely vulnerable to 
Israeli power by the collapse of its Egyptian alliance and seeking to redress the 
imbalance, tried to use the Lebanese civil war to impose its leadership in the Levant, 
especially on Lebanon and the PLO. This precipitated a PLO-Syrian conflict that would 
never be wholly healed.45  
Thus, if, in the 1973 war, co-operation between the Arab states benefited all, 
thereafter--caught in a classic prisoner's dilemma--none could trust the other not to 
seek individual gains unilaterally. While the Arabs as a bloc may have had the leverage 
to extract a comprehensive settlement if no one of them settled for less, Kissinger’s 
step-by-step diplomacy had divided them and henceforth forced them to individually 
play weakened hands in negotiations with Israel. Even as Nasserite Egypt's hegemonic 
role had established Pan Arab constraints on sovereignty, Egypt’s promotion under 
Sadat of sovereignty over Arabism released many remaining such constraints. The 
parallel popular disillusionment with Arabism further released constraints on the 
conduct of realpolitik by individual states. 46 
 
The 5th Arab-Israel War (1982) 
Yet, the vacuum left by the decline of Arabism was not simply filled by greater 
identification with the individual states but even more so by heightened identification 
with either smaller sub-state identities or with the larger Islamic umma, the latter 
particularly heightened by the Iranian Islamic revolution. Indeed, there were failed 
Islamic uprisings in both Syria and Egypt at the end of the decade. As Meridi Nahas 47 
argues, the decline of Pan Arabism made regimes especially vulnerable to revolutionary 
Islam because the same grievances that had fuelled the rise of Pan-Arabism—above all 
Israel’s denial of Palestinian rights--persisted. The most powerful manifestation of this 
tendency would be the rise of Hizbollah, precipitated by a convergence of the 1979 
Islamic revolution in Iran and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
At the same time, in Israel the irredentist right was strengthened. The Labour 
party's relative failure in the 1973 war shattered its traditional dominance of Israeli 
politics and shifted the Israeli political spectrum toward the Likud Party and the 
militant settler movement, Gush Emunim, which promoted illegal settlements in the 
occupied West Bank. Settlements increased threefold and settlers tenfold while Israeli 
acquisition of land and control of water resources was greatly accelerated.48 Likudist 
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Israeli Prime Minister Begin decreed the annexation of Jerusalem in 1980 and of the 
Golan Heights in 1981.  
As a result, the 1980, Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, instead of being the first step 
in a phased ending of the Arab-Israeli conflict, merely displaced the battle-lines toward 
the occupied West Bank/Gaza and to Lebanon. The PLO, expelled from Jordan in 1970, 
had in the following decade entrenched itself in Lebanon from which it sought to carry 
on a desultory guerrilla war against Israel. Israeli retaliation against Lebanon was a 
major factor in sparking the Lebanese civil war and this war, in turn, allowed the 
emergence of a PLO ‘state-within-a-state’ in southern Lebanon, precipitating an Israel’s 
1978 establishment of a strip of southern Lebanon as a “security zone.” This, followed 
by the removal of Egypt, via its separate peace, from the Arab-Israeli power balance, 
and the election in Israel of an even more radically irredentist leadership, including 
Begin, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, set the stage 
for Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.  
The Likud government’s aim was to establish unchallenged regional hegemony by 
smashing the PLO and punishing Syria, perceived as the last obstacles to its 
incorporation of the West Bank and Golan into Greater Israel. It aimed to drive both out 
of Lebanon and impose a client regime in Beirut, thereby isolating and encircling 
Syria.49 The attempt failed and, indeed, precipitated a balancing reaction: Syria’s a 
military build-up created a deterrence relation with Israel50 that kept the Golan Heights 
front quiet; but at the same time the invasion, gave rise to Hizbollah, a much more 
effective asymmetric threat to Israel than the PLO had ever been and whose guerrilla 
warfare forced Israel to abandon its occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000. However, 
the failure of the invasion did not, on the whole, empower doves in Israel and, except for 
brief interludes in which more conciliatory Labour governments explored the peace 
process, the irredentist right would continue its dominance of Israeli politics for the 
next three decades, inexorably pursuing the settlement of the West Bank, creating the 
“facts on the ground” that would make a land-for-peace political settlement nearly 
impossible.  
 
Conclusion 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was neither wholly a war of choice/opportunity or of 
vulnerability. For Israeli elites, it was an opportunity to end Israel's strategic 
vulnerability by acquiring more defensible borders and force its acceptance in the 
region. The actions Arab leaders took, which gave Israel an excuse to go to war, issued 
from vulnerability rooted in the regional power struggles in which firmness against 
Israel was essential to legitimacy; this resulted from the rise of Pan-Arab nationalism 
and the inter-Arab rivalry played out through dangerous ‘outbidding’ and 
brinkmanship.  
 The consequences of war furthered divergence rather than stimulating  
convergence between Israel and the Arabs. On the Arab side, defeat in 1967 ushered in 
the decline of Egyptian hegemony and of Arab nationalism as a hegemonic ideology. The 
1973 war precipitated a second watershed, Arab official acceptance of peace with Israel. 
These two wars initiated a transition toward a more multi-polar state-centric system in 
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which identity became more state-centric in the Arab world and individual state 
interests eclipsed the putative Arab national interest in shaping their foreign policies. 
The resultant Arab inability to combine against Israel shifted the power balance 
permanently toward it. The outcome also differentiated the Arab states’ approach to 
Israel: Egypt’s peace made it “status quo while the continued Israel occupation of Syrian 
territory (Golan Heights), kept a residual revisionism in Damascus’s foreign policy. Non-
state actors, from the PLO and Hamas to Hizbollah also remained revisionist.  
Overwhelming victory made Israel more secure but also more confidant it could 
impose its wishes militarily. This led the Arab front-line states to seek to redress the 
military imbalance, leading directly to the 1973 war, which partly righted the power 
balance and pushed Israel to reach a separate peace agreement with Egypt. This, 
however, left Syrian and Palestinian grievances unresolved and, in taking the largest 
Arab power out of the power balance with Israel, greatly reduced Arab leverage. But, 
again, the imbalance in Israel’s favour was insufficient to impose a pro-Israeli peace; 
rather the war-inducing power transition scenario was reproduced. Israel made 
another attempt in 1982 to break the stalemate; but its failure in this war only restored 
a balance of frustration in which no side could achieve its objectives, leading to periodic 
further rounds of fighting which did nothing, either, to settle the world’s most 
intractable conflict. 
 
